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Shifting plaintiffs'  fees versus increasing 
damage awards 
Louis Kaplow* 
Shifting victorious  plaintiffs'fees to defendants  and increasing  damage awards are alternative 
ways to achieve similar results:  increasing  plaintiffs' incentives to sue and raising defendants' 
expected  payments. This article shows that relying on higher damage awards is more efficient 
than shifting plaintiffs'fees.  The reason is that fee  shifting is more valuable for plaintiffs 
with higher litigation costs. Thus, it is possible to substitute higher damage awards  for fee 
shifting in a manner that leaves deterrence  unaffected  while eliminating the suits ofplaintiffs 
with the highest litigation costs. 
1.  Introduction 
*  Many statutes involve shifting victorious plaintiffs' fees or other costs to defendants in 
order to encourage the filing of lawsuits and increase liable defendants' expected payments.' 
Increasing damage awards, as by using a multiplier, is another, less frequently employed, 
technique for accomplishing these results.  This article  demonstrates  that using higher  damage 
awards  rather than shifting plaintiffs' fees enables one to produce the same expected penalty 
for defendants while reducing total litigation costs. 
Section 2 proves the result in the context of a simple model of litigation. The intuition 
is that increasing  damages rewards  plaintiffs  in a manner that depends upon their probability 
of victory, without regard  to their litigation costs. In contrast, fee shifting is relatively more 
valuable  to plaintiffs  whose litigation costs are higher.2  As a result, substituting  higher  damage 
awards for fee shifting reduces the number of suits by eliminating those suits that involve 
the highest litigation costs. The total costs of litigation are thereby reduced. Deterrence is 
maintained because with higher damage awards, defendants pay more than they paid with 
fee shifting when they lose to plaintiffs who have low litigation costs. 
This result is in the spirit of Becker's (1968)  argument with respect to public law 
enforcement that it saves resources to  achieve a given level of deterrence with a lower 
probability and a higher sanction. The result here involves fewer plaintiffs bringing suit, 
* Harvard University and NBER. 
I am grateful for comments from Bruce Hay, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and the referees. 
' There are more than a hundred such federal statutes (in areas such as antitrust, environmental protection, 
and civil rights), and similar provisions in most states. (See Newberg, 1986.) As will be noted below, the analysis 
also is relevant  to two-way fee shifting,  as under the British  rule (which is often proposed  for ordinary  civil litigation). 
2 The main reason litigation costs differ among plaintiffs is that their cases are not equally easy to prove. 
(Consider variation in the difficulty of tracing injuries to a source of pollution or proving whether an employer's 
action was motivated by impermissible discrimination.) Differences among lawyers (perhaps arising from differing 
agency costs) might also be significant. 
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while those who sue and are successful recover more, on average. In this setting, however, 
the result arises in a rather different manner, and the reduction in private suits involves the 
more costly ones. Qualifications to the Becker strategy, notably concerning parties' risk 
aversion, remain applicable. 
Section 3 extends the analysis to the case in which plaintiffs differ not only in their 
litigation costs but also in their probability of success. It also comments on two-way fee- 
shifting schemes, settlement, and the endogeneity of litigation costs. Section 4 concludes 
by discussing the choice among methods of encouraging and discouraging  suits. This section 
addresses the relationship between this article and recent literature on penalizing losing 
plaintiffs and decoupling defendants' payments and plaintiffs' awards. 
2.  Model  and  analysis 
U  Risk-neutral parties engage in litigation. Plaintiffs have a probability of victory of p. 
Possible plaintiffs differ in their litigation costs c, where c has the distribution f(  C).3  The 
damages awarded are d,  subject to a multiplier m.  The defendant pays the share s of a 
victorious plaintiff's costs. Finally, a defendant incurs litigation costs of k. 
Thus, a plaintiff will sue if and only if 
pmd-c(1-ps)?O.  (1) 
In expression ( 1), pmd represents the expected judgment at trial and c is the plaintiff's 
litigation cost, while a plaintiff's expected recovery of costs is psc. From ( 1), it follows that 
a plaintiff will sue if and only if his litigation costs are below a threshold, 
*  pmd  (2) 
1 -Ps' 
A defendant's behavior is assumed to be determined by the expected total costs as a 
result of the prospect of litigation. This aggregate  expected cost is 
E=  f  (pmd + psc + k)f(c)dc.  (3) 
The integrand is the defendant's expected cost from a plaintiff of type c who sues, weighted 
by the portion of plaintiffs who will be of that type. The expected award is pmd, the expected 
fee-shifting cost is psc, and the defendant's direct cost is k. Only plaintiffs with costs less 
than or equal to c* sue, which explains the upper limit of integration.4 
The social objective is taken to be the minimization of expected litigation costs, subject 
to the constraint that the defendant's behavior is unaffected-i.e.,  that E in (3) is constant. 
Expected social costs are 
L  =  (c + k)f(c)dc.  (4) 
For any suit that takes place, the total costs will be c for the plaintiff (the  amount will 
depend on the plaintiff's type) and k for the defendant. 
To prove the main result, consider the experiment of raising m and reducing s such 
that c*  remains constant. That is, for a given increase in the damage award, reduce the 
extent of fee shifting in just the amount  necessary to leave potential plaintiffs' decisions 
3 Litigation costs are treated as a unit, not distinguishing between fees and other costs, a distinction made in 
some fee- or cost-shifting rules. 
' This problem can be interpreted in two ways. One is that a defendant injures a single individual. The 
distributionf(  ) represents  the probability  that the person who is injured  will have litigation costs of c. Alternatively, 
the defendant may injure many individuals,  andf( *  ) would give the distribution  of characteristics  of those individuals. KAPLOW  /  627 
whether to  sue unaffected. This involves determining s as a function of  m,  so that the 
derivative of c* in (2)  equals zero. Taking this derivative yields 
ds  -  Ps(5) 
dm  pm 
Consider now expression (3),  for E.  The upper limit of integration, by construction, 
does not change as m is increased and s reduced according to (5).  Thus, the only effect on 
the value of E would be through the first component of the integrand: 
d 
(pmd + psc+k)  = pd+pcds 
dm ss(m)  dm 
pc( 1-ps)  = pd - 
pm 
=-(pmd  -  c(I  - ps))  0.  (6) 
The final inequality follows from ( 1 ), the condition for the plaintiff to sue. Moreover, except 
when evaluated at c*, the inequality will be strict. Thus, the integrand rises while the limits 
of integration remain the same; hence, E rises. 
Therefore, given an increase in m, the decrease in s necessary to keep E constant- 
and thus the defendant's incentives the same-is  greater than that given by (5).  In other 
words, s must fall by more than the amount necessary to keep c* constant.5 This fall in s 
will, therefore, reduce c*. 
Consider, now, how this increase in m and reduction in s that keeps E constant will 
affect social cost (4).  The integrand is unaffected, but, as just noted, c* falls. Therefore, the 
social cost L falls. Observe that this arises because fewer individuals sue (or, equivalently, 
the probability  of a suit is lower). In particular,  those plaintiffs  who no longer find it profitable 
to sue are the ones with costs near the former, higher level of c*-the  highest-cost plaintiffs. 
This demonstrates  that the optimal value of s-the  optimal extent to which the plaintiff's 
fees are shifted-is  as low as possible. Note that negative shifting would, in principle, be 
optimal. It would involve taxing the victorious plaintiff's fees, with the tax paid to the 
defendant. Such a rule, combined with a higher damage award, would increase the extent 
to which higher-cost plaintiffs were deterred from suing. In the limit, one could achieve a 
desired  level of deterrence  with a minuscule probability  of suit and an extremely high damage 
award, just as in the result due to Becker ( 1968) that optimal enforcement involves high 
sanctions applied with a low probability. 
The usual caveats concerning the desirability of moving to extreme sanctions apply. 
In particular,  the analysis here assumes that the parties are risk neutral. Substituting higher 
damage awards for the shifting of plaintiffs' fees discourages some suits while increasing 
plaintiffs' recoveries in others.6  This introduces more risk for both prospective plaintiffs and 
defendants. The optimal scheme, therefore, would stop short of extreme damage awards to 
the extent parties are risk averse and not fully insured.7 
I It is straightforward  that s must fall by more than the amount given by (5)  rather than less. When s falls, 
c* and the integrand in (3)  fall, both causing E to fall. 
6 Since suit is less likely and the defendant's expected payment is the same, it must be that those who sue 
have higher expected recoveries (on average). 
7 See Polinsky and Shavell (1979).  This qualification may be of limited applicability with regard to many 
fee-shifting statutes, notably in connection with civil rights and environmental legislation, where losses are often 
nonpecuniary and the primary purpose offered for fee shifting is to encourage suits that individual victims (each 
suffering  small losses) have no incentive to bring and that may involve injunctive relief, leaving no common fund 
from which to compensate attorneys. In such instances, a statute could provide for a monetary award that does 628  /  THE  RAND  JOURNAL  OF  ECONOMICS 
3.  Extensions 
*  Plaintiffs with differing litigation costs and probabilities of success. One could extend 
the model to consider plaintiffs that differ in their probability of success. If this were the 
only dimension of difference (i.e., there was no heterogeneity with regard  to litigation costs), 
fee shifting would be identical in its effect to a damage enhancement equal to the cost of 
litigation.  When  plaintiffs differ along  both  dimensions  (the  model  would  substitute 
f( c, p),  the joint distribution of c and p), the result depends on whether courts can observe 
the probability of success (as has been assumed to be feasible in much past fee-shifting 
litigation) .8 If they can, then the higher damage award, m(p),  could be selected so that the 
argument is precisely as in Section 2. If not, the same award enhancement must be applied 
in all cases, which makes the analysis more complex. It can be shown that an increase in 
damage awards  and decrease in fee shifting that keeps deterrence unaffected eliminates some 
high-cost suits but encourages some low-cost suits. The typical suit would be a less costly 
one, but the total number of suits might fall, as in Section 2's model, or rise.9 
o  Two-way fee shifting. The model could be extended to incorporate shifting a portion 
of successful defendants' fees as well. If one takes the extent of shifting of defendants' fees 
as given, the results are unaffected. Thus, it would reduce costs to  replace two-way fee 
shifting with shifting of defendants' fees only, while increasing the damage award to leave 
defendants' expected payments the same.10 
O  Settlement and litigation costs. The savings from eliminating costly lawsuits are reduced 
to the extent that most cases settle. But as long as the amount of a settlement is positively 
related to trial awards, increasing the damage award and reducing the extent of fee shifting 
in a manner that keeps the defendant's expected payment the same will be relatively disad- 
vantageous to plaintiffs with higher costs. 
Shifting plaintiffs' fees and increasing damage awards may affect the likelihood of set- 
tlement differently. On one hand, asymmetric information concerning plaintiffs' litigation 
costs may make settlement less likely with fee shifting. On the other hand, substituting a 
higher damage award for fee shifting increases stakes, on average. When parties  are relatively 
overoptimistic (i.e.,  if the plaintiff's estimate of the probability of victory exceeds the de- 
fendant's estimate),  the plaintiff's minimally acceptable demand rises by more than does 
the defendant's maximum offer, which may make settlement less likely." 
not depend on the actual costs of the case, which would provide appropriate incentives to sue and equivalent 
deterrence without encouraging relatively costly cases. 
8 Until the Supreme Court's decision in City of Burlington v. Dague,  112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992),  the practice 
was to enhance fee awards to account for the probability that no fee would have been recovered, since fee awards 
are contingent on plaintiffs'  success. (The Court rejected  this practice in part because a full adjustment would make 
the profitability of cases to lawyers-implicitly  assuming their risk neutrality-independent  of the probability of 
success. Under the new approach, cases will be unattractive to profit-motivated lawyers whenever the probability 
of success is less than one, unless plaintiffs supplement the fee award themselves.) 
9 This complication would be less important if classes of cases have similar probabilities of success (so that 
damage awards could be tailored to particular  types of cases) or if one could, using the methods discussed in Sec- 
tion 4, separately discourage low-probability suits. (The low-cost suits encouraged by moving from fee shifting to 
higher damage awards are relatively low probability suits.) 
10 Shifting successful defendants' fees is a form of penalty on unsuccessful plaintiffs, as explored in Sec- 
tion 4, except that it provides more precise compensation to successful defendants while inducing defendants to 
spend more. 
" This is necessarily true only in a simple model in which there is settlement if and only if a mutually 
beneficial settlement exists. It is not obvious that the possibility of fewer settlements should, in principle, weigh 
against a change. A technology that cut litigation costs in half would make settlement less likely. But one could tax 
trials in a manner that offset the effect on settlements. A similar tax on litigation expenditures here or in other 
contexts would increase settlements without increasing real resources devoted to lawsuits. KAPLOW  /  629 
Litigation costs in each case would also be affected. First, the increase in stakes that 
arises when substituting a higher damage award for fee shifting would tend to increase 
litigation expenditures per case. Second, eliminating fee shifting raises  the expected marginal 
cost to the plaintiff of litigation expenditures, which would tend to decrease litigation ex- 
penditures per case.'2 (These effects would, in turn, affect the incentive to sue.) Finally, it 
is noteworthy that substantial litigation costs are incurred in the process of determining the 
appropriate fee award under fee-shifting rules.'3 
4.  Choosing  among  methods  of  encouraging  and 
discouraging  suits 
U  Suits can be encouraged by raising damage awards, shifting victorious plaintiffs' fees to 
defendants, or subsidizing the filing of suits (e.g., by providing free legal services). Similarly, 
suits can be discouraged by reducing damage awards, shifting victorious defendants' fees to 
plaintiffs, imposing other penalties on losing plaintiffs, or charging filing fees."' This article 
has shown that shifting victorious plaintiffs' fees to defendants rather than raising damage 
awards may be a perverse way to encourage suits, since the inducement tends to be more 
attractive  to higher-cost plaintiffs. Shifting plaintiffs'  fees achieves a given level of deterrence 
with more suits and, in particular, by encouraging suits that are relatively more expensive. 
Recent literature has explored other ways of adjusting the rewards and penalties for 
bringing suit in a manner that would reduce litigation costs. Polinsky and Rubinfeld ( 1992, 
1993) indicate that penalizing losing plaintiffs, while increasing the award for those who 
win, can reduce the number of suits necessary to achieve a given level of deterrence.'5 (In 
particular, this change makes filing a suit less attractive to plaintiffs with low probabilities 
of success while increasing  the net expected award  to those with high probabilities.  16  ) Polinsky 
and Che ( 1991 ) demonstrate how decoupling-making  the defendant pay damages that 
differ from what a plaintiff receives-can  achieve a given level of deterrence with fewer 
suits. (For example, increasing  the defendant's  payment and decreasing  prospective  plaintiffs' 
recoveries induces fewer to sue, but maintains deterrence by making the defendant pay 
more in each successful suit.) 
This literature and the present article offer some basis for choosing among the ways of 
affecting the incentive to sue.17  Filing subsidies increase deterrence by encouraging suits, 
without particular  regard  for litigation  costs or the merits. Shifting  plaintiffs'  fees to defendants 
has a relatively greater effect for high-probability cases, but this method of increasing de- 
terrence also increases litigation, with the additional suits being filed by plaintiffs  with higher 
legal costs. In contrast, increasing damage awards for victorious plaintiffs (or penalizing 
losing plaintiffs, directly or by shifting defendants' fees) targets plaintiffs solely according 
to their probability of success. Decoupling  allows one  to discourage costlier and lower- 
probability suits. These latter alternatives, therefore, allow a given level of deterrence to be 
12 Katz ( 1987) analyzes effects of both types. 
1 Courts must determine the amount of work effort, whether the work effort was appropriate,  how the effort 
should be valued, and what if any multiplier should be applied to account for risk (see footnote 8). 
14 Obviously, many other changes in legal rules would affect the incentive to file suits. 
'5Katz  (1990)  discusses penalizing losing  plaintiffs, but  does  not  consider increasing awards to  those 
who win. 
16 Polinsky and Rubinfeld's articles ( 1992,  1993) are close in spirit to the present article. They focus on 
discouraging  low-probability plaintiffs, while this article focuses on discouraging high-cost plaintiffs. (Another dif- 
ference is that the model here allows for a continuum  of plaintiffs, making the benefit of an extreme solution, 
discussed at the end of Section 2, more apparent.) 
17 The discussion here is limited to policies that directly affect the decision whether to sue, rather than those 
concerned with settlement, although both types of policies obviously affect both suit and settlement. 630  /  THE  RAND  JOURNAL  OF  ECONOMICS 
achieved  with  fewer,  less  costly  suits.18  It was  noted,  however,  that  parties'  risk  aversion 
may qualify such results. 
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